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Observers of Silicon Valley’s computer cluster report that employees move rapidly between 
competing firms, but evidence supporting this claim is scarce.  Job-hopping is important in 
computer clusters because it facilitates the reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with 
superior innovations.  Using new data on labor mobility, we find higher rates of job-hopping for 
college-educated men in Silicon Valley’s computer industry than in computer clusters located 
out of the state.  Mobility rates in other California computer clusters are similar to Silicon 
Valley’s, suggesting some role for features of California law that make non-compete agreements 
unenforceable. Consistent with our model of innovation, mobility rates outside of computer 
industries are no higher in California than elsewhere.    
 
JEL Classification R12, L63, O3, J63; J48 
 
Keywords: agglomerations, clusters, non-compete agreements, human capital, innovation, 
Silicon Valley, modular production.I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The geographic clustering of firms is a ubiquitous, but poorly understood, feature of advanced 
economies.
i Explanations for geographic concentration have focused on “external economies of 
scale” or equivalently “agglomeration economies.”  These terms refer to mechanisms that 
improve the efficiency of production when other related firms co-locate in an area.  In this paper 
we use new data to examine a much-discussed source of “external economies of scale” in a 
much-discussed industry and economic cluster.  Our focus is on the computer industry and the 
agglomeration economy we investigate is the easy mobility of skilled employees among firms in 
Silicon Valley. 
Annalee Saxenian (1994) was among the first to observe that high rates of mobility were 
a source of agglomeration economies in Silicon Valley.
ii  She argued that the sustained high-
rates of innovation of computer firms were the result of two unique aspects of the industrial 
organization of the region.  The first feature was that computer systems manufacturers relied on 
networks of independent suppliers who specialized in incorporating the latest technological 
advances into modular components (Saxenian 2000).  The modular nature of these components 
increased the rate of technical innovation in the region by enabling rival suppliers to pursue 
simultaneous and independent innovation strategies so long as the resulting components 
conformed to the design rules that integrated the components into the final product (Baldwin 
and Clark, 1997).    
The second key feature of the industrial organization of Silicon Valley was the rapid 
movement of technically sophisticated employees between firms in the region.   This high rate 
of mobility among technical employees reinforced the benefits of modularity because skilled 
employees rapidly transferred from firms with inferior designs to those with superior designs.   
Job-hopping between companies, however, also increases the likelihood that knowledge 
acquired in one firm is employed in another.  These knowledge spillovers can hamper 
innovation by reducing the rewards to investing in human capital.   An implicit assumption in 
Saxenian’s discussion of Silicon Valley is that the benefits of the agglomeration economies 
exceed the attendant losses due to knowledge spillovers.  Gilson (1999) brought attention to this 
assumption and observed that high rates of mobility by knowledgeable employees were likely to 
impose non-trivial costs on employers.  These costs may cause employers to take actions to 
limit job-hopping even when the social benefits of agglomeration economies exceed the costs.  
 
1“Non-compete agreements,” according to Gilson, are the most important legal mechanism for 
reducing inter-firm mobility.  These agreements limit an employee’s ability to work with 
competing firms in a specific geographic area and for a specific period of time.  It turns out that 
features of California state law introduced serendipitously in the 1870’s make it impossible for 
employers to enforce non-compete agreements.  But for this historical accident, Silicon Valley 
employers would have had at their disposal an easy way to inhibit costly mobility.  California’s 
legal system is exceptional in its treatment of non-compete agreements.  Thus Gilson’s 
hypothesis may explain why mobility (and agglomeration economies) should be unusually high 
in Silicon Valley.  His hypothesis also suggests that similar high rates of mobility should be 
observed in computer clusters elsewhere in California, but not in other states.   
Saxenian’s and Gilson’s accounts have captured much attention in management and 
policy circles. Unfortunately data limitations have, until now, precluded direct empirical 
examination of some of the key features of the story — especially the movement of employees 
between firms within a narrow geographic region and industry.
 iii  
In this paper we exploit little-used data from the Current Population Survey to measure 
the rate of employer-to-employer mobility in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.  We find, first, that 
employees working in the computer industry cluster in Silicon Valley do indeed have higher 
rates of mobility than similar computer industry employees in other metropolitan areas having 
large information technology clusters.  Second, and consistent with Gilson’s hypothesis that 
California state law is important for sustaining hyper-mobile employment, there appears to be a 
“California” effect on mobility.  That is we find similar high rates of mobility of computer 
industry employees throughout the state of California.  Third, we find that the mobility patterns 
observed for employees working in the computer industry do not hold for employees in other 
industries residing in these same locations.   This last result suggests that interaction between 
features of the computer industry and those of a particular geographic location, rather than 
features of the location alone, drive our findings. 
The approach we take differs in two ways from other empirical studies of agglomeration 
economies and human capital externalities.
iv  First, we focus on employee mobility within a 
labor market rather than on the returns to education.  We adopt this approach because inter firm 
mobility is more closely related to the agglomeration economy conjectured to operate in Silicon 
Valley.
v  Second, we examine our variable of interest for a specific industry within 
geographically specified labor markets.  This industry focus is important because the 
 
2agglomeration economies we analyze are likely to be especially important in industries like 
computers where the gains from innovation are large but also uncertain.  
Our paper proceeds in three parts.  In the next section, we consider the effect of job-
hopping on human capital investments and agglomeration economies and identify the conditions 
necessary for a Silicon Valley type computer cluster to appear.  In section three, we present our 
empirical results.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the limitations of our analysis and 
issues for further study. 
 
II. HUMAN CAPITAL EXTERNALITIES, AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES, AND 
NON COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
 
In this section we consider the effect of job-hopping within an industrial cluster on human 
capital investments and agglomeration economies.  We seek to establish three points.  First, that 
rapid employee mobility within a cluster will lead to underinvestment in human capital.  
Secondly, that job hopping can be a source of agglomeration economies, so long as the 
underinvestment in human capital is not “too large.” Third, that conditions prevailing in the 
computer industry make it especially likely that hyper-mobility will produce agglomeration 
economies.    
 
Investments in Human Capital and Human Capital Externalities  
Our analysis relies heavily on the model in Acemoglu (1997).
 vi   Following Acemoglu (1997) 
we posit an imperfect labor market in which employers and employees bargain over the surplus 
produced in period two of the employment relationship after investments in human capital are 
made in period one.
 vii  The value produced in period two is y+at, where y is a positive constant, 
a is the quality of the firm’s technology, and t is the level of general human capital investments 
made in period one.
viii An important feature of this specification is that technology and human 
capital investments are complementary, the returns to human capital investment increase the 
higher the quality of technology.   
Into this setting we introduce job separation of the sort analyzed in Acemoglu (1997).  
Specifically we assume that employment relationships are severed by random shocks that occur 
with probability s after human capital investments are made in period one.  In the reallocation of 
labor subsequent to these shocks, the dislocated employees each find work at a different firm in 
period two. Similarly the employers affected by these shocks will also have new employees in 
 
3period two.  The surplus produced by the period two employer’s technology and the period two 
employee’s human capital is divided according to an exogenously determined sharing rule.  
Thus employers with new employees in period two benefit from human capital investments 
made in a different employment relationship in period one.  The resulting externality reduces 
incentives to invest in human capital.   
More formally, Acemoglu (1997 p. 451, equation 2) writes the ex ante total surplus 
produced by each employment relationship as: 
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The cost of acquiring knowledge, c(t), is a convex function of  t, the amount of general human 
capital acquired.  These costs are incurred in period one while the benefits from the human 
capital investments arrive in period two (hence the discounting). Each employment relationship 
stays intact with probability (1-s) and produces y+ at.  Employment relationships sever with 
probability s.  In this case, the employee gains a proportion, 0< β < 1, of the surplus produced in 
the second period using the employer’s technology and their own human capital.  Conversely, 
employers gain a fraction, (1-β), of the surplus produced by their own technology and the 
human capital of their new employee.  The expected human capital of the employees displaced 
by the random shock is represented by E(t% ).   
Acemoglu (1997, proposition 2 p. 451) demonstrates that in this setting there is a unique 
equilibrium in which training investments maximize the total surplus as described in (1) above. 
If we simplify equation (1) by specifying that the cost of investment function c(t)= ct
2, then we 
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In this case it is also easy to show that if parameters s and β  are such that 0 < s, β <1 then 
surplus will be maximized only when both employers and employees pay for some investments 
in t.   Notice that with these parameter values  ˆ dt dβ  > 0 and  ˆ dt ds < 0.  These results are 
intuitive.  Incentives to invest in human capital increase with β because employees dislocated in 
 
4period two recoup a greater return on prior investment in human capital.   Conversely, 
incentives to invest in human capital are reduced when the probability of separation increases 
because with each separation some fraction of the benefits from period one human capital 
investments spill over to other employers.    
Using equation (2) the value produced by each employment relationship in period two is: 
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Introducing Silicon Valley Type Agglomeration Economies 
ix  
According to Saxenian (1994) and Baldwin and Clark (2000), the technological dynamism in 
computers stems in part from their modular design.  Modularity enables rival suppliers to pursue 
simultaneous and independent innovation strategies so long as the resulting components 
conform to the design rules that integrate components into the final product.   Computer makers 
can then pick the best of these for use in their products.   
A simple way to introduce modularity into Acemoglu’s set-up is to allow it to shape the 
technology variable, a, in equation (3).   More specifically we assume that innovation is a 
random process and the quality of the technology that emerges, a, is determined by a random 
variable drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to γ.  The larger is γ, the greater is 
the expected return to innovative activity and the greater is the variation in outcomes.  If there 
are g component makers in the industrial cluster, the expected value of the “best” design to 
emerge from the component makers is the first order statistic for the uniform distribution 










 with g > 1. 
 
It is clear from (4) that the value of the best technology increases with the number of component 
suppliers in the cluster, g, although there are diminishing marginal returns to g.  Note as well 
that a is also increasing in γ.   
For the innovation process described in (4) to be a source of agglomerateion economies, 
it needs somehow to be localized (Rotemberg and Saloner 2000).  This is where job-hopping 
 
5enters the picture.  The firm with the “best” component design can sell its product to all the 
computer makers in the district, provided it hires enough of the employees working at other 
component makers to achieve the requisite scale of production.  Since employees change jobs 
most easily when they do not have to move their households, the innovation advantages of 
modularity and job-hopping are best realized when the g component makers locate in a 
particular location. 
x   
This argument is not sufficient, however, to establish that job-hopping is a source of 
agglomeration economies.  The random process by which firms discover key innovations and 
the subsequent reallocation of labor to those firms produces exactly the sort of random shocks 
that occupy center stage in Acemoglu’s analysis.  We know from (3) that increasing s, the 
probability that employment relationships are disrupted, has ceteris paribus, the effect of 
reducing incentives to invest in human capital.  Thus for job-hopping to be a source of 
agglomeration economies, we need to establish the conditions under which increasing the value 
of the technology, a, offsets the potential losses due to reduced incentives to invest in general 
human capital, t.   
Our approach to this problem is to make the separation rate, s, an endogenous result of 
the competition between the g component makers in the cluster.  We do this in the simplest 
possible way by assuming that the firm with the “best” component design can sell its product to 
all the computer makers in the district, provided it hires the g-1 employees working at other 
suppliers to achieve the requisite scale of production in period two.
xi  Since all firms are ex-ante 
equally likely to discover the “best” design and since there can only be one “best” design, the 
probability that any component supplier finds it is 1/g.  Thus, s = 1- (1/g).   Substituting 
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Taking the derivative of y+at  with respect to g we find:  ˆ
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6By definition, agglomeration economies exist when  ˆ () dy t d g α + > 0. The derivative 
includes the opposing influence of agglomeration economies and human capital externalities. So 
long as the externalities do not reduce incentives to invest in knowledge too badly, i.e. so long 
as β is above some threshold, the gains from allocating employees to firms with the best 
technology ex-post exceed the losses due to reduced human capital investments ex-ante.
xii   
Because the marginal benefit to innovation of adding more component suppliers to the cluster 
declines in g, the minimum threshold value of β increases with g.  The results in (6) also 
demonstrate that the gains from agglomeration economies are greatest when γ is large.  This 
follows because the advantages of having multiple independent and simultaneous experiments 
are greatest when the gains to innovation are both large and uncertain.  Close observers of the 
innovation process in computers agree that γ is especially large in this industry (Baldwin and 
Clark, 1997 and 2000; and Aoki, 2001).
xiii 
 
Non-Compete Agreements   
Covenants not to compete are a legal mechanism to reduce the costly human capital externalities 
that result from job-hopping.
xiv  To the extent that non-compete agreements reduce the 
probability that an employee will be working for a new employer in the future, these covenants 
can induce higher levels of human capital investment, t. Firms may find it individually desirable 
to exercise these agreements even if this reduces the technological vitality of the industrial 
cluster.  And if such covenants are a more cost-effective way of inhibiting mobility than other 
methods (such as deferred compensation schemes), then we should expect to see lower mobility 
in clusters where non-compete agreements are available. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section we marshal little-used data on employee mobility to answer three questions that 
follow directly from the preceding analysis.  First, is the inter-firm mobility of employees in the 
computer industry indeed higher in Silicon Valley than in other IT clusters in  states with 
enforceable non-compete agreements?  Second, is there a “California” effect on the rate of inter-
firm mobility for computer industry employees, as one might expect if the agglomeration 
economies are due to features of California state law?  Third, since the conjectured 
agglomeration economies in Silicon Valley are manifest most strongly under special 
 
7circumstances (i.e. when γ is large), do the mobility patterns we observe in the computer 
industry hold for employees in the same location who are not employed in the computer 
industry?  The discussion in the preceding section suggests that the answers to these questions 
ought to be yes, yes and no. 
 
Data 
The data we use in our analysis come from a relatively new feature of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS).  With the redesign of the CPS in January 1994, the Census Bureau sought to 
reduce the number of questions asked afresh to respondents each month.  To avoid unnecessary 
duplication, interviewers asked some questions that refer back to the answers given in the 
previous month.  One specific instance of this “dependent interviewing” approach allowed for 
the collection of the mobility data we use in this study.  If a respondent is reported employed in 
one month and was also reported employed in the previous month’s survey, the interviewer asks 
the respondent whether they currently work for the same employer as reported in the previous 
month (the interviewer reads out the employer’s name from the previous month to ensure 
accuracy). If the answer is yes, then the interviewer carries forward the industry data from the 
previous month’s survey.  If the answer is no, then the respondent is asked the full series of 
industry, class, and occupation questions.  Using the answer to this routing question, we can 
identify stayers (workers employed in two consecutive months at the same employer) and 
movers (workers who changed employers between two consecutive months). 
The CPS data on month-to-month mobility are well suited for studying agglomeration 
economies.   The size and scope of the CPS sample is far greater than in most other household-
based survey data and this allows for quite detailed analysis by geographic location, educational 
level, and industry.  In addition, the CPS survey is administered monthly and this should reduce 
the recall errors found in other household surveys that ask respondents to remember their 
employers over longer stretches of time.   Finally, we can link the employment transition data to 
demographic and employment data for each individual. This allows us to consider the 
importance of potentially confounding influences on employer-to-employer mobility.  (See 
Fallick and Fleischman 2004 for a fuller description of the data.) 
The computer industry agglomeration economies that motivate our study emphasize the 
mobility of highly educated employees.  For this reason, we restrict our sample to those having 
a minimum of four years of college who also live in metropolitan areas having information 
 
8technology clusters.
xv  In addition, we focus our analysis on men to eliminate the potentially 
confounding effect of gender on mobility.  Finally, we pool across all the years in our sample 
period (1994 – 2001), in order to achieve a sample in the computer industry large enough for 
analysis.  All of our results include fixed year and month-of-interview effects to net out the 
influence of year-to-year as well as seasonal variation in economic activity.  The resulting 
sample has 44,202 individuals and 156,149 month-to-month observations.  The number of 
month-to-month observations for each individual ranges from 1 to 6 with the median being 3.
xvi  
Of the individuals in our sample, 3,768 (or 7.84%) were observed to have changed employers at 




Our empirical investigation requires that we identify employees in the computer industry.  If we 
define this industry too broadly, we risk including in our sample employees who are not part of 
the computer cluster.  Alternatively a very narrow definition risks excluding some employees 
who ought to be counted as part of the cluster.  For this reason, we present our key results in 
Tables 1 and 2 using both a broad and narrow definition of the industry. 
Table 1 estimates rely on a broad definition of the industry.  In it we present probit 
estimates of the probability that an individual in SIC 35 and 36 in month t changes employers 
before being re-interviewed in month t +1. 
xviii   The estimates in columns 1 and 2 are for a 
sample of 2972 men having 8966 month-to-month observations. The mean of the dependent 
variable is 0.0195 suggesting that employers were observed to change employers in 1.95 percent 
of the potential transitions.  For continuous variables, the probit estimates are presented as 
derivatives evaluated at the mean of the right-hand side variables; for dummy variables the 
estimates are presented as the difference in probabilities as the value of the variable switches 
from 0 to 1 with all other right-hand side variables at their means.  Thus the 0.008 coefficient on 
the variable Silicon Valley in column 1 indicates that living in Silicon Valley increases the rate 
of employer to employer job change by 0.8 percentage point.  This effect is both statistically and 
behaviorally significant — suggesting employer-to-employer mobility rates are more than 40% 
higher than the sample average.  On this basis, the impression of hyper-mobility that Saxenian 
noted in studies of the late 80s and early 90s appears to have persisted in Silicon Valley 
throughout the 1990s.  
Column 2 of Table 1 introduces a new variable, California, which is a dummy variable 
 
9equal to 1 if an employee in the computer industry in time t resides in a metropolitan area with 
an IT cluster in the state of California.  In this specification, we observe that the coefficient on 
Silicon Valley falls to zero while the coefficient on California is both behaviorally and 
statistically significant.  Ceteris paribus, employees in California’s IT industries have a rate of 
employer-to-employer mobility that is 1.1 percentage points above the sample mean (z score 
2.66) — an increase of 56 percent.  These results are consistent with Gilson’s hypothesis 
regarding California law.  The Silicon Valley effect on mobility appears to run throughout the 
state’s computer clusters.   
Column 3 of Table 1 estimates job change rates separately for each of the MSAs in 
California having IT clusters. Employees in the computer industry residing in Los Angeles and 
San Diego had mobility rates virtually identical to Silicon Valley.   The coefficient on Los 
Angeles is statistically significant at the 5% level and San Diego is significant at the 10 percent 
level.  This reinforces the conclusions drawn from column 2, i.e. that the high Silicon Valley 
mobility rates can be found elsewhere in California.
  
The mobility measures used in columns (1) through (3) look at all job changes for 
employees in the computer industry in month t regardless of the industry to which they move.   
In contrast, the estimates in columns (4) through (6) count as moves only those job changes in 
which the employer in month t and in month t+1 are in the computer industry.   The mean of this 
new intra-industry measure of job change is 0.009, indicating that roughly 46% of the employer 
to employer job changes for employees in the computer industry are to other employers in the 
same two SIC industries. 
The results in column (4) confirm the presence of high rates of employer-to-employer 
mobility in Silicon Valley.  The coefficient on Silicon Valley is 0.008 (z score = 3.27), 
suggesting that this measure of job change is nearly 90% higher in Silicon Valley than the 
sample mean.  Column (5) introduces the California dummy.  The coefficient on this variable is 
positive, but small in magnitude (0.002) and imprecisely measured (z = 0.880).  As importantly, 
the coefficient on Silicon Valley falls by twenty-five percent and also becomes statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels.  One can, however, easily reject the hypothesis that Silicon 
Valley and California are jointly insignificant (χ
2( 2) =  11.28 and  Prob > χ
2 =   0.0035).  Taken 
together, these results suggest that given the smaller number of employer-to-employer moves 
within the computer industry (as we define it), it is difficult to reliably distinguish a San Jose 
effect from a California effect.   
 
10In column (6) we disaggregate the California effect by looking at individual MSAs.  We 
observe a large and positive coefficient on Silicon Valley (0.009 and significant at the 1% level).   
In contrast the coefficients on the other California MSA’s are essentially zero and very 
imprecisely measured. 
Taken together, the results in column (6) support Saxenian’s claim that intra-industry 
mobility is higher in Silicon Valley than in computer industries located elsewhere.  These results 
do not offer support for Gilson’s hypothesis — heightened mobility seems to be concentrated in 
Silicon Valley , but is not observed in other MSAs. 
Why do we observe a California effect on mobility in columns (1)-(3), but not in 
columns (4)-(6)?   The answer can be found in the different mobility measures we employ.  The 
intra-industry measure of mobility used in (4)-(6) is the right measure to the extent that the 
boundary of the cluster corresponds to SIC industry classifications.  If, however, the boundaries 
of the cluster are not identical to the definition of the SIC industries, the measure in column (1)-
(3) that counts all job changes for employees initially in SIC 35 and 36, might give a more 
accurate picture of mobility rates. To see this consider what would happen if all jobs in SIC 35 
and 36 are in the IT cluster, but that the cluster also bleeds over into other related industries.  
For concreteness, imagine that the rates of job hopping in Silicon Valley’s and Los Angeles’ IT 
clusters were identical, but 100% of the employees in San Jose’s cluster are in SIC 35 and 36 
while in Los Angeles only 50% of the employers in the IT cluster located in SIC 35 and 36.  
Perhaps the remaining 50% are located in industries that make instruments used in computers 
and are therefore classified in SIC 38.  Using the measure of mobility in columns (1)-(3) (that 
counts all mobility in jobs that originate in SIC 35 and 36) we would find that job hopping rates 
are the same in Los Angeles and Silicon Valley, but using the alternative measure (that accounts 
only job changes within SIC 35 and 36) the measured rate of job change would be higher in 
Silicon Valley than LA.   There is some reason to believe that the boundaries of IT clusters do 
bleed into other industries and that this varies systematically by city.
xix  For this reason we 
interpret the absence of a California effect in columns (4)-(6) with some caution.  
  Columns (7) and (8) compare the “California” effect on mobility to the 
“Massachusetts” effect for each of our measures of employer to employer changes.
xx   
Massachusetts is interesting because it has the second largest IT cluster after Silicon Valley as 
well as a very different set of legal rules governing non-compete agreements.  In both equations 
we find a large and statistically significant coefficient on California.  We also observe that the 
 
11coefficient on Massachusetts is smaller than that on California, and that the difference is large 
in column (7) and small in column (8).  In both columns, however, the Massachusetts 
coefficient is imprecisely measured and one cannot reject the hypothesis that it is zero at 
conventional significance levels.  Unfortunately this imprecision in measurement also means 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on California is the same as the 
coefficient on Massachusetts.
xxi  Our conservative conclusion is that if a Massachusetts effect 
exists at all, we cannot be sure that it is different than the California effect.
xxii 
The results in Table 1 are based on a very broad definition of the computer industry, 
employees working in establishments that fall into SIC industries 35 and 36.  In Table 2, we 
redo the analysis using a narrower definition. 
xxiii   The results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively close to those in Table 1.  We conclude from this that our findings are not likely 
to be an artifact of the way we define the computer industry. 
Our model of innovation in industrial clusters suggests that hyper-mobility ought not to 
be a general feature of Silicon Valley or California labor markets.  Indeed, if we found evidence 
of hyper-mobility outside of computers, we might worry that the effects we are attributing to the 
industrial organization of IT clusters may be due to other, unobserved and unexplored, aspects 
of these labor markets.  In Table 3, we examine mobility patterns for employees not employed 
in the computer industry in month t.  We restrict the sample to employees not employed in SIC 
35 or SIC 36 in month t.  Our dependent variable is equal to 1 if an employee changed 
employers before the interview in month t+1.  Comparing the average monthly job change rates 
conditional on being employed in the computer industry (0.0195) with the average conditional 
on not being employed in the computer industry (0.0244), it appears that employer to employer 
movements are more common outside SIC 35 and 36. 
In column 1 of Table 3, the coefficient on Silicon Valley is small (about 1/10
th of the 
mean mobility rate of the population) and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the true effect is 
zero.  Column 2 introduces a California dummy variable into the equation.  The coefficient on 
California is also small, but negative and statistically significant while the Silicon Valley 
coefficient is positive and significant.  The mobility differential for being in Silicon Valley is 
the sum of these coefficients or 0.001.  This differential is both small and not statistically 
different from zero (χ
2(1) = 0.46).    Similarly when we disaggregate the California effect by 
introducing dummy variables for the California MSA’s with IT clusters (see column 4), we find 
no evidence that outside the computer industry job changes are more likely within California.  
 
12Indeed rates of job-hopping appear to be lower in Los Angeles and San Diego than elsewhere in 
the nation.  Taken together, the results in Columns 2 through 4 suggest that the high relative 
mobility rates in Silicon Valley and California do not hold outside of the computer industry.     
We conclude our empirical analysis by considering an alternative explanation of our 
results.  It is possible that mobility rates are higher in the computer industry in Silicon Valley 
because the high density of computer related employment creates a thick market for similarly 
skilled college-educated men that makes it easy to find a good outside match.   If this argument 
is correct, then looking outside of computers, one should find that a high density of information 
technology jobs or jobs for college-educated men in their own industry ought also to be 
associated with high rates of job turnover.  To assess this we introduce two measures of job 
density into the job change regressions. The first measure, Location Quotient IT, is a measure of 
the density of employment in the IT cluster in a respondent’s MSA.
xxiv  The second measure, 
Location Quotient Own Industry, estimates the density of employment in a respondent’s 
industry and MSA relative to the national average.
xxv  Introducing these variables into a job 
change equation yields positive coefficients that are very imprecisely measured considering the 
size of the sample.  Thus we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the effects of Location 
Quotient IT or Location Quotient Own Industry on mobility are zero.   We also cannot reject the 
hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly zero.
xxvi  On this basis it does not appear that our 
results can be explained simply by the thickness of the local market for college-educated 
employees in their own industry or in IT industries.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper uses new data to compare the inter-firm mobility of college-educated male 
employees in Silicon Valley’s computer industry to similarly educated employees working in 
the computer clusters in other cities.  The hyper mobility we document for Silicon Valley’s 
computer cluster is consistent with Saxenian’s account of agglomeration economies there:  
frequent job-hopping facilitates the rapid reallocation of resources towards firms with the best 
innovations.  Our finding of a “California” effect on mobility lends support to Gilson’s 
hypothesis that the unenforceability of non compete agreements under California state law 
enhances mobility and agglomeration economies in IT clusters.  Our final finding, that 
heightened mobility is a feature of California’s computer industry but not of other California 
industries, is consistent with our model of modular innovation and with claims that external 
 
13economies of scale are particularly important for the innovation process in the computer 
industry. 
This interpretation of our results must be qualified by the limitations of our data.  We 
observe only the movement of employees between firms and the correlation of these mobility 
rates with industry and location.  Thus, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that rapid employee 
mobility may be the result of some unobserved features of computer firms in California rather 
than the agglomeration economy we posit.  In addition, we do not observe employment 
contracts and therefore have no direct evidence that the “California” effect on mobility is due to 
the absence of enforceable non-compete agreements.  As a result we cannot rule out the role that 
other factors (such as local culture) may play in sustaining high rates of employee turnover.     
Finally, our analysis suggests that agglomeration economies observed in Silicon Valley’s 
IT cluster ought not to be a general economic phenomenon.  Rather they should arise in settings, 
like computers, where the gains from new innovations are both large and uncertain.  It would be 
useful to search for other industries and industrial clusters where this condition might hold to 
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  16Table 1 
Determinants of Month-to-Month Job Changes: Conditional on Being in the Computer Industry Broadly Defined (SIC 35 and 36) 
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Wi thi n 
Industry 
[0.009]
Silicon Valley  [0.166] 0.008 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.009
(2.02)* (0.100) (2.54)* (3.27)** (1.750) (3.37)**
California  [.302] 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.006
(2.66)** (0.880) (3.43)** (2.98)**
Los Angeles [0.069] 0.015 0.004
(2.41)* (1.050)
Orange County  [0.030] 0.002 0.000
(0.280) (0.090)
San Diego  [0.037] 0.015 0.002
(1.860) (0.420)
Massachusetts  [0.089] 0.008 0.005
(1.48) (1.24)
Full-Time [0.961] 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.01 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (1.24) (1.23) (1.24) (0.35) (1.23)
U.S. Citizen [0.748] -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.74) (0.34) (0.39) (0.85) (0.70) (0.71) (0.37) (0.82)
Married  [.753] -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0 0 -0.002 0
(0.82) (0.71) (0.73) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.64) (0.12)
Post College Schooling  [.332] 0.001 0.00 0.00 (0.00) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.30) (0.47) (0.44) (0.56) (0.51) (0.53) (0.36) (0.42)
Year Fixed Effects 1994 - 2001 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age Dummy Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8966 8966 8966 8966 8966 8966 8966 8966
Number of Individuals 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972 2972
Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors adjusted for clustering within individual).  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if respondent changed jobs between two consecutive months.  Up to 6 potential transitions are observed for each 
individual. These estimates are for job changes from month t to t+1 conditional on being employed in the computer industry (SIC 35 and 36) in month t. 
Thus, from column 1, we see that we observe 2972 individuals over 8,966 month to month observations.  1.95% of these potential job changes resulted in 
actual job changes.  
The coefficients in the table are derivatives, i.e. they reflect the impact of the variable on the probability of observing a job change between two consecutive 
months.  Thus, in column 1, residing in Silicon Valley increases the probability of job change by 0.8%, roughly forty percent above the base rate of job 
change for the sample.
 In columns (2) and (5) chi square tests indicated that Silicon Valley and California were jointly significant at better than the 1% level.  In columns (3) and (6) 
chi square tests indicate  that Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and Orange County  were  jointly significant at the 5% level. One cannot reject the hypothesis that 
these coefficients are jointly equal in magnitude either.
The variable Silicon Valley  includes the cities of San Jose, San Francisco, and Oakland California.  Age dummies are:  < 25, <35, <45, < 55, < 65 years oldTable 2 
Determinants of Month-to-Month Job Transitions Conditional on Being Employed in the Computer Industry Narrowly Defined (Census 322 and 342)
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Wi t hi n 
Industry 
[0.0083]
Silicon Valley  [0.224] 0.014 0.002 0.019 0.008 0.006 0.009
(3.14)** (0.32) (3.79)** (3.55)** (1.79) (3.67)** `
California   [0.350] 0.015 0.002 0.017 0.008
(3.04)** (0.91) (4.29)** (3.58)**
Los Angeles  [0.063] 0.019 0.002
(2.39)* (0.64)
Orange County  [0.028] 0.011 0.006
(1.03) (1.12)
San Diego  [0.034] 0.023 0
(2.17)* (0.01)
Massachusetts  [0.093] 0.006 0.004
(0.84) (1.06)
Full-Tim e  [0.965] 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.60) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.49) (0.55)
U.S. Citizen  [0.732] 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0 0.004 0.000
(0.59) (1.00) (0.98) (0.25) (0.12) (0.09) (0.99) (0.25)
Married [0.749] -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001
(1.38) (1.19) (1.21) (0.47) (0.51) (0.55) (1.14) (0.70)
Post College Schooling  [0.348] -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(1.26) (1.02) (1.03) (1.81) (1.75) (1.73) (1.07) (1.77)
Year Fixed Effects 1994 - 2001 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age  Dummy  Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5773 5773 5773 5773 5773 5773 5773 5773
Number of Individuals 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961 1961
Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors adjusted for clustering within individual).  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent changed jobs between two consecutive months.  Up to 6 potential transitions are observed for each 
individual.    These estimates are for job changes from month t to t+1 conditional on being employed in the computer industry narrowly defined (Census 322 or 342) 
in month t.  Thus, from column 1, we see that we observe 1961 individuals over 5773 month to month observations.  1.96% of these potential job changes resulted 
in actual job changes.  
The coefficients in the table are derivatives, i.e. they reflect the impact of the variable on the probability of observing a job change between two consecutive months.  
Thus, in colum n 1, residing in Silicon Valley increases the probability of job change by 1.4% , roughly 70%  above the base rate of job change for the sample.
Age Dummy Variables: < 25, <35, <45, < 55, < 65.  In columns (2) and (5) chi square tests indicated that Silicon Valley and California were jointly significant at 
better than the 1% level.  In columns (3) and (6) chi square tests indicate  that Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and Orange County were jointly significant at the 1% 
level.  One cannot reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly equal in magnitude either.Table 3  
Determinants of Month-to-Month Job Changes Conditional on Not Being Employed in the Computer 
Industry (i.e. not being in SIC 35 or 36) 
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Silicon Valley [0.067 ] 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004
(1.05) (2.16)* (0.69) (1.79)
California [0.238] -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(2.51)* (1.81) (2.65)
Los Angeles [0.126] -0.003
(2.00)*
Orange County [0.023] -0.001
(0.37)
San Diego  [0.022] -0.006
(2.16)*
Location Quotient IT Sector -0.00002
   [1.91 ] (0.06)




Full-Time [ 0.871] -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
(12.42)** (12.49)** (12.49)** (12.48)** (12.46)**
U.S. Citizen [0.842] 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.62) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19) (0.10)
Married [0.683] -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(3.27)** (3.39)** (3.38)** (3.43)** (3.42)**
Post College Schooling [0.375] -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(1.51) (1.63) (1.61) (1.55) (1.70)
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Age Dummy Variables yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 147183 147183 147183 147183 147183
Number of Individuals 42232 42232 42232 42232 42232
Observed/Potential job changes 0.0244118 0.0244118 0.0244118 0.0232 0.0232
Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses (with standard errors adjusted for clustering within individual).  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if respondent changed jobs between two consecutive months.  Up to 6 potential 
transitions are observed for each individual.    These estimates are for job changes from month t to t+1 conditional on not 
being employed in the computer industry (SIC 35 and 36) in month t.  Thus, from column 1, we see that we observe 42232 
individuals with 147,183 month to month observations.  2.4% of these potential job changes resulted in actual job changes.  
The coefficients in the table are derivatives, i.e. they reflect the impact of the variable on the probability of observing a job 
change between two consecutive months.  Thus, in column 1, residing in Silicon Valley increases the probability of job change 
by 0.2%, less than 1/10th of the sample mean.
Age Dummy Variables: < 25, <35, <45, < 55, < 65.  
In column (2), the mobility differential from living in Silicon Valley is the sum of the coefficients on Silicon Valley  and California .  
One cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of these coefficients is 0 (χ
2=0.46).
Location Quotient IT is a ratio measure of the concentration of a cluster in a particular location relative to the national average.  
Thus Location Quotient IT > 1 indicates a higher than average concentration in that location in the year 2000 (see Cluster 
Mapping Project (2003) for details).  
Location Quotient Own Industry is an analogous variable constructed using our sample of college educated men.  We first 
calculate the fraction of college educated men in an MSA who are in each two-digit census industry and then divide this by the 
average value for the entire sample.    Thus Location Quotient Own Industry > 1 indicates an MSA which has a higher fraction 




i   For an excellent and comprehensive review of the literature on geographic clustering see Rosenthal 
and Strange (2003).  Porter (1998) discusses the policy implications of clusters. 
ii   Some discussion of mobility preceded Saxenian’s work; see for example, Angel 1989. 
iii   The only other paper we know of that examines mobility in high technology clusters is Almeida and 
Kogut (1999).  They use patent records to study the mobility patterns of 438 individuals who held 
major, semiconductor-related patents.  They find higher rates of mobility in Northern California than 
elsewhere in the country.   
iv   Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2004a) study how returns to education vary with the 
educational attainment of others in a geographically specified labor market (defined respectively as 
cities or states). Moretti finds some evidence in favor of the existence of human capital externalities 
while Acemoglu and Angrist’s results offer less support.  Moretti suggests that these differences 
result from the use of different instrumenting strategies that give weight to different parts of the labor 
market (Moretti, 2004a, p. 207).  In a second paper, Moretti (2004b) reports that the productivity of 
plants in cities that experience large increases in the share of college graduates rises more than the 
productivity of similar plants in cities that experience small increases in the share of college 
educated.  This remarkable study offers strong support for the existence of agglomeration economies 
linked to human capital, but does not assess the mechanisms by which these spatial agglomerations 
work.  In contrast, our work focuses on the very specific agglomeration mechanism proposed for 
computer clusters – job mobility in the context of the modular innovation process in computers. 
v   Indeed the model of agglomeration economies and human capital externalities we rely on does not 
make clear predictions about wages (see Acemoglu 1997, p. 453).    
vi   Acemoglu’s model establishes a number of important results regarding knowledge spillovers.  He 
finds, for example, that investments in general skills will be suboptimal and that part of the costs 
might be borne by employers (Acemoglu, 1997).  A related paper (Acemoglu 1996) offers a new 
microeconomic explanation for increasing returns to human capital accumulation. 
vii   In Acemoglu (1997), the key labor market imperfection is costly job switching.  Search costs create a 
job-specific employment rent over which workers and employers bargain. This assumption of high 
job switching costs may not be appropriate, however, in a setting characterized by hyper-mobile 
employees.  Instead we motivate the bargaining over employment rents by positing asymmetric 
information between the current employer and other firms in the cluster.  Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999) discuss a number of ways that imperfect information about the nature of human capital 
investments or about the ability of employees can produce employment rents.  They also demonstrate 
that in such settings it may be efficient for employers as well as employees to invest in general 
human capital. 
viii   The economy is composed of an exogenously determined number of firms each with a Leontieff 
production function in which one, risk-neutral employee, produces a fixed output in period two 
based upon technology and investments in human capital made in period one.   
ix   Our discussion focuses on the sorts of agglomeration economies highlighted by observers of the   21
 
 
computer industry.  There are, of course, many other potential sources of agglomeration economies.  
Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) consider the role that clusters play in inducing industry-specific 
human capital investments.  They argue that suppliers will be reluctant to undertake industry-specific 
investments if they anticipate only one local customer for their product.  The fear that a single 
customer may exert monopsony power is reduced, however, if a number of customers locate in an 
area.  The result, in our context, is a computer cluster with many computer makers and many 
component suppliers. 
x   Saxenian’s (1994) discussion also highlights another benefit of mobility: job-hopping employees 
with significant tacit knowledge interact with one another and these interactions facilitate informal 
yet value creating information exchanges between computer makers and component suppliers.  
These informal exchanges are hard to document, but a number of authors have used patent citations 
as a proxy and they find that citations are geographically localized (see Agrawal, Cockburn and 
McHale, 2003, for a review and some new evidence.)  Including informal information exchanges in 
our model would enrich the analysis, but would not alter the key results. 
xi   Specifically we assume that the demand for components is fixed and that the g employees working at 
the “winning” component maker can supply enough components to meet demand. 
xii   The number of component makers does not, of course, grow without limit.  For any given level of β 
it is straight-forward to derive the equilibrium value of g, i.e. the value of g  where the return to a 
firm entering the cluster just equals the return to setting up operations outside the cluster. 
xiii   “For an industry like computers, in which technological uncertainty is high and the best way to 
proceed is often unknown, the more experiments and the more flexibility each designer has to 
develop and test the experimental modules, the faster the industry is able to arrive at improved 
versions” (Baldwin and Clark, 1997, p. 85). 
xiv   Gilson’s original discussion of non-compete agreements in high technology districts emphasized 
their importance for firms seeking to retain control over trade secrets and proprietary innovations 
should employees move to competitors. Acemoglu’s (1997) analysis makes clear, however, that the 
costs of knowledge spillovers can be substantial even when all human capital is general and when 
firms retain full control over their trade secrets and technology.  As a contractual form, non-compete 
agreements are well suited to inhibiting both these sorts of knowledge spillovers because the 
(unknown) future employer needn’t be party to the initial agreement. 
xv   Information on metropolitan areas with the top 20 IT clusters by employment in the year 2000 is 
taken from The Cluster Mapping Project (2003).  We include the following metropolitan areas 
(MSAs): San Jose, Boston (with Worcester Lawrence MA_NH), Austin, Dallas, Seattle, Phoenix, 
Orange County, Washington, Portland, San Francisco, Raleigh, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego, 
Minneapolis, Oakland, Atlanta, Philadelphia, Houston, and Denver.  Details on the identification of 
clusters are in Porter (2003).  We define Silicon Valley as being in the MSAs of San Jose, San 
Francisco, and Oakland, but our results also hold if we define Silicon Valley as San Jose only. 
xvi   The CPS has a short panel structure — respondents are in the sample for four consecutive months, 
out for 8 consecutive months and in again for four consecutive months.  Thus each individual can 
have at most 6 month-to-month potential transitions.  The median is less than 6 for the following   22
 
 
reasons: (1) some individuals’ final four months occurred in 1994; (2) some individuals’ initial four 
months occurred in 2001; and (3) for administrative reasons only 6 months of data are available for 
1995.  In addition, some individuals move from one month to the next and these are lost to the 
survey because an individual is identified, in part, by the location of their residence.  Others are lost 
to nonresponse or other data problems.  After taking account of these factors, the number of 
individuals lost from the sample is consistent with other published studies.  Details on the algorithm 
used to match individuals from one month to the next are available in Fallick and Fleishman (2004). 
xvii  If we assume that this rate of mobility holds for every month an individual is on a job, then the 
probability a newly hired employee will be at the job in one year is (1-.0241)
11 = 0.76.  This figure 
may appear high, but it is worth noting that the hazard of exiting a firm is not constant. Our 
confidence in the CPS mobility data is further strengthened by the fact that it produces estimates for 
broader measures of turnover that match well with data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household 
Dynamics (LEHD) program at the Census Bureau.   The LEHD uses tax records from the 
unemployment insurance program that constitute a near universe-count of on-the-books wage and 
salary employment in the participating states.  The LEHD matches these records over time by 
employer and employee.  We tabulated data from 20 of the 50 states, representing about 55 percent of 
total employment in the U.S., for a period from late-1995 through mid-2003.  (The data are available, state 
by state, at "http://lehd.dsd.census.gov.”)  Over this period, the average quarterly separation rate and 
accession rate from the LEHD, as a percent of employment, were 20.1% and 20.6%, respectively.  The 
comparable rates from our matched CPS data are 19.9% and 19.7%, respectively.    
xviii  SIC 35 and 36 constitute a conventional but overly broad definition of the computer industry: 
industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment, and electronic and other electrical 
equipment and components, except computer equipment.  
xix   In a private communication with one of the authors, Saxenian observed that the computer clusters in 
Silicon Valley and San Francisco are highly concentrated in firms that belong in SIC 35 and 36, 
while the LA/Orange County/San Diego clusters tend to bleed into other industries — especially 
instrumentation. 
xx   Our sample is confined to respondents in MSA’s defined by Porter as having an information 
technology cluster.  Thus all the respondents for which Massachusetts is equal to one are in MSA 
1120. 
xxi   A χ
2  test of the hypothesis that California = Massachusetts in column (7) yields: χ
2 (1) =  0.50 Prob 
> χ
2   =    0.4799.  The similar test for equation (8) yields χ
2   (1) = 0.32  Prob > χ
2   =  0.5699 
xxii  Colorado is similar to California in that its state law prohibits non-compete agreements.  There are, 
however, a number of exemptions to this law.  For our purposes the most important one is that non-
compete’s are allowed if they are intended to protect trade secrets.  Inserting a dummy variable for 
Denver into our Table 1 regressions one finds that working in Denver’s computer industry increases 
the probability of job change by 2 percentage points but the estimate is quite imprecise (z = 1.42).  It 
is hard to know if this imprecision is due to the importance of the loophole in the Colorado law or to 
the small number of observations in Denver, the only MSA in Colorado with an IT cluster. In other 
unpublished results we re-estimated equation (7) using a complete set of state dummies with 
California as the omitted state.  We find that 11 out of 15 dummies had negatively signed   23
 
coefficients, a few significantly so, and none had significantly positively signed coefficients.  
Although many of the individual coefficients were not statistically significant, the entire set of 
dummies was highly significant. 
xxiii  Specifically our narrow definition includes employees in two three-digit census industries:  
computers and related equipment (Census 322); and electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, 
not elsewhere classified (Census 342).  Census 322 includes: electronic computers (SIC 3571); 
computer storage devices (SIC 3572); computer terminals (SIC 3575); and computer peripheral 
equipment, not elsewhere classified (SIC 3577).  Census 342 is a residual category from which most 
non-computing electrical devices have been excluded. 
xxiv  This variable is constructed by dividing the fraction of MSA employment in it’s IT cluster by the 
national average of the fraction of IT employment in the year 2000.  See Cluster Mapping Project 
(2003), for details.   
xxv  This variable is constructed from our sample of college-educated men.  For each individual, we 
calculate the fraction of employment in their two digit census industry in their MSA pooling across 
the years 1994-2001.  We then divide this by the average of all MSA’s in our sample.  Thus when 
Location Quotient Own Industry = 1, the respondent’s MSA has the same fraction of employment in 
an industry as does the average MSA. 
xxvi   χ
2   (2) = 2.89.  We also find that these density measures have no influence on job changes if we 
insert them into the Table 1 equations that focus only on employees in the computer industry.   